Abstract-Intrusion detection and response systems (IPSs) for literature based on two intrusion prevention systems, motl protecting against distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks host-based IPS (HIPS) and network-based IPS (NIPS) bfte dsturibued in diferent doaindrspn m akigicifcurtlt. foIec them, which also increases the communication overhead. In this coflthebourcties atoac detectio and responde accuroateyce, paper, we present a collaborative approach to distribute the claoaieatc eeto n epneapoce r sampling, detection, and response responsibilities among all the required to capture all the traffic fr-om all the distriue routers within the AS in such a way that each router can detect sources to the victim. Second, it is difficult to differntit and respond to DDoS attacks. Our proposed approach achieves legitimate and DDoS attack traffic at the sources, sincth coordination among all the routers in the network to eliminate volume of the traffic is not big enough and traffic nl redundant sampling, detection, and response tasks without aggregates at the points close to destinations. Although D exploiting any specific communication protocol. We propose an WARD can generate filtering rules at the source, it consue optimal assignment of disjoint flows to each of the routers within more memory space and CPU cycles than some NIP!s[] the ASs in such a way that all the flows destined for the same host Hence, source-side HIPSs are not effective against Do will be sampled, analyzed, and properly responded at the same attacks. router. Each router can thus capture the correlation between flows destined for a specific destination.
detection and response tasks. Many overlay communication routers of the local network or access routers of an ASta protocols have been introduced in the literature to achieve connect to the subscribers' edge routers [1]. Source-side'HP, coordination among the routers but they generally have high aim to detect and filter the attack traffic but they areno communication overheads. Furthermore, DDoS detection and prciaagns oStak.Theaetwraos response requires that all the flows intended to the same pracetica ageratinst Dof aittak.Terinues aretorasonst whic destination be analyzed together in order to efficiently capture mrciake ath goreneraion of s Fistern rule soagainst Dof not the correlation between them. In order to do that,, current pedsracicalute source-siden HIPs.airst thein souce oificattak can approaches centrally collect all the sampled data and analyze bfte dsturibued in diferent doaindrspn m akigicifcurtlt. foIec them, which also increases the communication overhead. In this coflthebourcties atoac detectio and responde accuroateyce, paper, we present a collaborative approach to distribute the claoaieatc eeto n epneapoce r sampling, detection, and response responsibilities among all the required to capture all the traffic fr-om all the distriue routers within the AS in such a way that each router can detect sources to the victim. Second, it is difficult to differntit and respond to DDoS attacks. Our proposed approach achieves legitimate and DDoS attack traffic at the sources, sincth coordination among all the routers in the network to eliminate volume of the traffic is not big enough and traffic nl redundant sampling, detection, and response tasks without aggregates at the points close to destinations. Although D exploiting any specific communication protocol. We propose an WARD can generate filtering rules at the source, it consue optimal assignment of disjoint flows to each of the routers within more memory space and CPU cycles than some NIP!s[] the ASs in such a way that all the flows destined for the same host Hence, source-side HIPSs are not effective against Do will be sampled, analyzed, and properly responded at the same attacks. router. Each router can thus capture the correlation between flows destined for a specific destination.
In the destination-side HIPSs, detection will be done motl at the destination and the response will be initiated n Keywvords-Network security; Intrusion detection systems; DDoS distributed to other nodes by the victim. There existvaiu attacks;dIistri buted IDS; collaborative IDS destination-side approaches where detection and responsre
NTODCTONplaced
either at the edge routers or access routers o h I. INTRDUCTIONdestinations' AS. In the first kind of destination -side deteto undesirable traffic. Packet filtering approaches are completely 0 We propose a coordination scheme to aid collaborto dependent on attackers' power, and when it increases, filters among all the nodes in the network without explotn become ineffective and they cannot properly be installed. The optimization engine of CSamp uses the traffic matrix to sampling the traffic among all the routers in a path(wti and the routing information as an input in each sampling period the AS). Similar to CSanip, we do not exploit any speii to compute the optimized distribution of sampling communication protocol to achieve coordination amongalth responsibilities among allI the routers within the AS. The output routers toward eliminating redundant sampling, detectionad of the optimization engine is then translated into sampling response tasks. Furthermore., to address the second limitatino manifests or a list of hash ranges for each flow and then
CSamip, we cover all the flows within the AS in our apprac manifests are sent to all the routers within the AS.
by relaxing the router constraints. We believe that witth
The idea of reducing duplicate measurements in the development of fast memory, better processing capacityan network has been introduced earlier in [21] . CSamp adds two contraitsecren tt of thear routers' israsnbe.aHoweve, welplant features to the idea of [21] . First, CSamp considers resource eondtait our approuesi esnbe oeew constraints on the routers. Second, CSamp uses hash-based exten orapoach in future to consider and explore hs sampling to obtain coordination among all the routers within cosritanthrefcsonurdiginep. the AS without any explicit communication.
111.
COLLABORATIVE 
B. Setup) Process
The set of all the routers which occur in at least twopah Table I lists the notations used to describe the design of our (Rco"`?1l11 ) can be found through a pseudo code given -in'Fiur approach. We will also define them when we refer to them for 2. the first time. There are five sets that should be initialized as the inputs for the assignment/optimization formulation in the that all the flows with the same DestIP will be assigned to exactly one router, and cannot be split among 
(6)
It ensures that flows with the same DestIP in different chancesarer toas thoe flostiwaith the sames destinatione paths will be assigned to only one of the common toace the ommonignthsflwwihheam sini routers of those paths. tthcomnrouters. Hence, there might be no commo router among all the paths to the same destination at the (
7)
This constraint ensures that all the flows of the closer to the source. In that case, our approach just fulfil h particular path will be assigned to the routers on that load balancing objective and assigns all the flows evnl path. In other words, the total number of flows in a among all the routers within those ASs. As we mentoe particular path that are being assigned to the different earlier, it is still worth to detect a fraction of attack flowand routers should be the same as the total number of flows stop them earlier at ASs closer to the source. in that path.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS (8)
This constraint enables us to avoid a nonlinear objective I hsscin edmntaehww mlmn function that includes absolute values; we impose these asign ths ection, we demi onstrateiow wein implemete ou r constraints using the variables defined in (9) so that the gawassgnet/opteifization fomtion uesinglCPLEX. our mai resltig ormlatonis iner.formulation. We have considered three real-world topolge (9) Z4, Z' are two positive variables we defined for each nml SL(ni) bn Erp) n TT(S.I router k to implement absolute function in our objective each topology we assume: function (i.e. these variables are used to liberalize the I-Hloftemxumpsienmbrfpah objective function of the model).
1-rHafeofthed maimu possibl numbe of. pahsared preentd i TbleIII(eg. 60 paths for VSNL (Inia) (10) Shows that the decision variables (Xijk ) are binary 2-Half of the maximum number of flows (e.g. 4 milo variables.
flows for VSNL (India)).
The-outom of ou LPfruainpoieDh otr' 3 afo tedsiainIsocri tlattopts
We have also increased the number of common DestiPs in
Facilitating routers within the AS to cover link flooding atak each topology in our measurement, in order to see if it affects that aim to congest a link or disrupt all the communicationvi the performance of our approach drastically. The outcome of that link (e.g. sending attack packets to a range of destinto our measurements showed that the number of common DestlPs, addresses or a subnet) is a future endeavor. does not affect the performance of our approach. AKOLDMN router's constraints in such a way that we can guarantee that all 
